under the direction of the village leader. The leader and the elders decided all questions concerning village activities. The administration of justice was in the hands of the elders, while the enforcement of decisions was a common village enterprise; thus the village peace was kept. The raw framework of the village collectivity moved as a unit into the Soviet era.

The Kazakh lineage supplied the basis for the practice of marrying outside the group. The lineage occupied a common territory, and during the course of the past century the unit of common residence rather than the unit of descent and kinship has served to regulate marriage. Wives are sought outside the village; girls leave their native villages to join their husband's people, although this may not involve moving a great distance. The lineage is today generally identical with the village, and under the Soviet regime, with the collective farm. There is today the practice of kolkhoz exogamy.[1]

The practice of polygamy has likewise proved compatible with Soviet conditions. In former times, the many-wived family was the family of the well-born, the rich, the influential; today, the many-wived family is that of the village leader, the kolkhoz president, the brigade foreman. The leviratic marriage of the widow to the brother of the deceased or to another close kinsman has also accommodated itself to Soviet conditions, within the framework of the extended family, for among the peoples of the steppe this practice depends upon and reinforces the extended family structure. In Kazakhstan, the extended family rests on the close integration of several fraternal households and the conjugal families of a father and his sons and at times even grandsons.

The Soviet ideological campaign has directed attention to the practice of polygamy among leading elements in Kazakh collective farms; similarly, a number of reports indicate that leviratic marriage is still practiced. Soviet ethnographers do not discuss these institutions from the standpoint of the functions of the Kazakh extended family and the Kazakh village community. Instead, they have made a political issue out of what they are pleased to call the survival of the feudal mores. But they choose to ignore the fact that the practices which they condemn are part and parcel of the existing family and village system.

The status of women in Kazakhstan is a serious question to Soviet ideologists. In 1944, in 1949, and again in 1951, the Kazakh Party leadership was briefed by the Central Committee in Moscow regarding the participation of Kazakhs, of Kazakh women, and of literate and educated people in the Kazakh Communist Party (see Chapter 6, which deals with the Party). That the program has evidently fallen short of plan is suggested by the repetition of the instructions. The Kazakhs are not coming forward for training in Party work, despite the fact that they are periodically encouraged to do so, and despite the prestige and material advantages of Party membership. And the women lag behind the men in this respect.

Woman's position in Kazakh society, and the Soviet failure to understand the background of this position, has important consequences in the

[1] Ibid., p. 86.

8:Krader & Wayne E-4 (no date) 1955 RQ2 Kazak RQ2
Kazakhstan RQ1

Chapter 6

THE PARTY

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665

If one were to ask what organization gives direction to the development of public affairs and private lives in Kazakhstan, the answer would be simple: it is the Communist Party. This hierarchical body is by its very structure and character totally alien to the Kazakh way of life of a few decades ago. The idea was imported from Russia, the establishment entrusted to Russians. Or, in the more flowery language of Kazakhstanskaia Pravda:

> "During the time of tsarist oppression the Russian Party guided the struggle of the Kazakh toilers. Russian bolsheviats living in Kazakhstan carried on propaganda. . . . Russian workers, leading bolsheviats, were pioneers and leaders of the Kazakh masses. . . . The best sons of Russia were shining examples for Kazakhstan during those trying times." [1] [When the Revolution and the Civil War came] "the Kazakh Party stood in the vanguard of those fighting Dutov, Kolchak, the counter-revolutionary bourgeois nationalist party 'Alash Orda', and other hirelings of Anglo-American imperialism. . . . Training of Communists was closely linked to the names of Lenin and Stalin. Kirov, Kuibyshev, Kalinin, Frunze, Kaganovich, brothers-in-arms of Lenin and Stalin, played an important role in the creation, development and strengthening of the Kazakh Party organization." [2]

From "about 2,000 Communists" in the villages and auls of Kazakhstan in 1918, the membership increased rapidly with the turn of the civil war, so that the first Provincial Conference of Kazakh Bolsheviks' meeting at Orenburg in June 1921 represented about 30,000 members and membership candidates. By now, the Communist Party of the KSSR has close to a quarter of a million members.

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[563]

The role of the Party as a leader and teacher of the masses took on a special significance in the national minority areas of the USSR. In Stalin's words, it is the task of the Party "to eliminate the economic, political and cultural backwardness bequeathed to oppressed peoples by

[1] "The Role of the Russian People in the Socialist Transformation of Kazakhstan," *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*, 5 Apr 47.

[2] "The First Provincial Conference of Kazakh Bolsheviks," *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*, 16 Jun 51.

[3] The nomenclature for Communist Party gatherings is confusing. These meetings were called "conferences" until the establishment of Kazakhstan as a union republic (1936); since then they have been called "congresses" and are numbered consecutively. Before the establishment of Kazakhstan as an autonomous republic within the RSFSR (1924), the term "provincial conference" was used.

8:Krader & Wayne E-4 (no date) 1955 RQ2 Kazak RQ2
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665
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[our] predecessors, and thus enabling backward nations to catch up with Central Russia. The Party must get into the thick of the struggle . . . against chauvinist great-power deviations as well as against native bourgeois nationalism." The first step toward the goal must be taken by "going out among the non-party toilers and bring about a closer relationship between the Party, the working masses and the peasants. . . ."[1]

The programmatic statements of the early days foretold the Party's continuous involvement in the solution of many complex tasks. In that respect the Kazakh Party is, of course, not different from the Communist Party throughout the Soviet Union. Daily events in every phase of life are considered within the legitimate concern and responsibility of the Party. In order to keep up its ubiquitous control, the Communist Party maintains a highly ramified apparatus composed of several kinds of bodies.

ORGANIZATION OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE KSSR

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665

Organizationally, the Communist Party varies little from one republic to another (except, of course, for the RSFSR). Here, only a brief outline will be given of its organizational structure in the KSSR. For greater detail the reader is referred to the sources on which this outline is based.[2]

One may, first of all, distinguish four levels at which the various bodies operate (see Figure 4):

(1) Republic (KSSR)
(2) Region (Oblast), 16 in number[3]
(3) District (Raion) or city (Gorod), 239
(4) Primary organization level, 14,416

At each level, one finds a representative organ which convenes at regular intervals. These are called congress (at the central or republic level), conference (region, district, and city), or general meeting (primary). At the three top levels, the representative organs elect committees (Russian terms: TsK, KP (b), KSSR; Obkom; Raikom or Gorkom), executive bodies which carry out Party work while the respective representative organs are not in session. Both the representative and executive bodies are guided by the decisions of the All-Union Party and the directives of the higher echelon. At the sessions of the representative organs, reports by the Committee, the Audit Commission, and others are heard and approved. Here, too, delegates to the representative bodies of the next higher level are elected. At the same occasion the Committee elects a small group of persons[4] (including three secretaries[5]) who form the bureau, the day-to-day executive office of the Party. Committee

[1] *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*, 16 Jun 51.

[2] *Tovarisch* (123), 1951; Meisel and Kozera (97), 1950, esp. pp. 327-345; Gsovski (57), 1953, pp. 29-32; Fainsod (48), 1953, pp. 189-208.

[3] These figures were reported at the Fourth Kazakh Communist Party Congress, 1949.

[4] Eleven at republic and regional level, seven to nine at the district or city level.

[5] Secretaries must have been Party members for at least five years (three years for district or city). The All-Union Communist Party Central Committee must confirm the selection of the first secretaries of the regional bureaus. The secretaries of the district and city need confirmation by the regional and republic committees.

KN 665

The chief concern of district and city organizations is the activity of primary Party organizations, over which they have control. According to latest available information, there were over 14,000 such organizations within the KSSR in 1949 (as compared with about 350,000 for the USSR as a whole[1]).

The primary organizations are the "grass roots" of the Party, the broad base of its hierarchical pyramid. From Fainsod's detailed description of their functions one fact emerges clearly: These units play the part of the eyes and ears of the Party—they are not designed to represent the "voice of the people" in the authoritarian organization of the Party.

KN [676]

For purposes of psychological warfare it would be interesting to speculate about the self-image of the typical member of the primary organization. Does he perceive that his position in the Party does not correspond to the status ascribed to him by the surrounding community? Or does he see himself as an important and influential (or at least potentially influential) citizen, by ignoring the fact that the goals and needs of the individual member and of the primary organization are not respected by the higher authorities? It is easy to infer that in the first case the discrepancy between ascribed status of influence and actual impotence may lead to persistent frustration on the part of the voiceless Party member. And if this situation were typical among the 200,000 primary organization members, they might well be considered as a special target group for psychological warfare.

On the other hand, material gathered in refugee interviews by the Harvard Russian Research Center seems to indicate that the second hypothesis is more plausible, at least for Russian primary organization members.[2] In fact, on the basis of that information, it may be argued that these people are probably the least promising audience for psychological warfare operations. However, the lowly Communist of Kazakh nationality may find himself in a position quite different from his Russian counterpart.

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Unfortunately, no information is available about the state of mind of the Kazakh Communists, as distinct from the problems and actions of the Communist Party of the Kazakh SSR. Nevertheless, it seems pertinent to look at whatever is known about the members and role of the Kazakhs within the Party.

The latter can best be evaluated by analyzing the past and present leadership of the Party in terms of ethnic background and progression of assignments. This task will be undertaken at the end of the next chapter within the discussion of leadership overlap between Party and Government.[3]

Data on ethnic composition are not plentiful, but published figures seem to indicate that the Kazakhs are not underrepresented in the Party, at least not numerically. Table 8 summarizes the information available for certain key years.

KN [562]

To a certain extent, the proportion of women in the Communist Party reflects the Party's appeal to the women of Kazakhstan. Frequent

[1] *Ibid.*, p. 196.
[2] Personal communication from Raymond A. Bauer.
[3] [See category 116, pp. 105-108 --analyst]

8:Krader & Wayne E-4 (no date) 1955 RQ2 Kazak RQ2
Kazakhstan RQ1

Table 8

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162
665

PROPORTION OF KAZAKHS IN THE TOTAL POPULATION AND IN THE COMMUNIST PARTY

Year	Population	Kazakh Proportion of Total Population (%)	Party Members and Candidates	Kazakh Proportion of Total Membership (%)
1926	6,503,000[a]	57[b]	32,000[c]	35[c]
1939	6,146,000[a]	42[b]	109,000[d]	32[d]
1949	6,650,000[e]	41[f]	229,000[g]	40[h]

[a]USSR Census.
[b]Lorimer and Goldware estimates (89).
[c]Goloshchekin, 1931.
[d]*Bol'shevik Kazakhstana*, Feb 49.
[e]By interpolation from Goldware estimates for 1948 and 1950 (89).
[f]Based on Goldware's report on KSSR population (89).
[g]*Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*, 25 Feb 49.
[h]Ibid., 16 Jun 51.

Table 9

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562

WOMEN IN THE KSSR COMMUNIST PARTY

Year	All Women (Per Cent of All Members and Candidates)	Kazakh Women (Per Cent of All Members and Candidates)
1927[a]	7.7	1.3
1940[b]	13.9	ND
1945[b]	32.1	ND
1949[c]	19.2	4.0

[a]Goloshchekin, 1931.
[b]*Bol'shevik Kazakhstana*, Feb 49.
[c]*Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*, 16 Jun 51.
ND: No data available.

KN
562
665
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criticisms by Party leaders indicate that more women would be welcomed into the ranks and that the Kazakh Communist Party has a bad recruiting record; one can therefore assume that the rather low number of women in the Party is not due to any officially stated policy of exclusion. Only during the war years were any significant gains made. Especially poor is Party recruiting performance among women of Kazakh nationality (see Table 9). A set of figures, however, cannot adequately describe the role women play in the Kazakh Communist Party. In recent times women have been placed in responsible positions in increasing numbers. In 1951, for example, 12 out of 85 members of the Central Committee were women, and every regional committee and almost 90 per cent of the districts and cities had one female secretary.[1]

[1]According to figures in Meissner's book (98) and in *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*, 20 Mar 47 and 26 Feb 49, women took a considerably more active part in government. From 1947 through 1952, consistently over one-third of all local Soviet delegates were women; out of 400 Supreme Soviet members, 149 were women (37%); *Sovetskaia Zhenshchina*, Sep-Oct, 1952.

KN 44A 665 numbers in the Kazakh SSR (and probably in any minority republic where the non-Russian native population is less well educated than the Russians) is that "qualification for a job" implies not only technical proficiency but also political reliability. For higher-ranking positions political sophistication and active participation may actually be required in addition to professional training and experience.

K [665] [661] Adding to these conditions Moscow's continuous demand that more and more natives be brought into the machinery ("korenizatsiia aparata"), one can see the predicament of the Kazakh bosses. In the past it has often happened that the only candidates qualified in terms of training and political reliability were relatives of those already in administrative positions. The accusation of nepotism is, therefore, fairly frequent. This and other complaints in connection with the cadre system are voiced in some detail in a Central Committee decree of March 1947, "On the selection, training, and placement of Party and Soviet cadres by Kazakh Communist Party organization." The most pertinent clause of this decree, repeated recently in Kazakhstanskaia Pravda (21 September 1952), reads: ". . . selection of cadres [of Party workers] on a basis of friendship, personal devotion, family ties and kinship is incompatible with membership in the Party."[1] The social basis of nepotism in Central Asia has been discussed previously, in regard to family relations.

KN 665 933 964 At present the men in charge in Kazakhstan seem to be counting on an increase in the general level of education to solve this knotty problem. The importance of the economic problem for the Kazakh Party is shown by the fact that its two most powerful first secretaries lost their jobs over manpower and production failures. The energetic Goloshchekin was replaced when too-rapid and brutal collectivization procedures resulted in social and economic disaster. More recently Shaiakhmetov, probably the most skillful politician to dominate Soviet Kazakhstan, was demoted (together with other responsible officials) when agricultural production failed—by a wide margin—to reach the planned level.

It is perhaps surprising that Shaiakhmetov managed to remain in power as long as he did (seven years). Since the end of World War II, Moscow had been applying pressure for better exploitation of Kazakhstan's potential in animal husbandry and grain production. Warnings by the Central Party organs (including Pravda) were numerous and explicit. The historical details are not important here except insofar as they support the argument that the 1954 demise of several Kazakh leaders was primarily an economic rather than a political purge. This interpretation was reinforced recently by the report that Comrade Shaiakhmetov had been "re-elected" by Alma-Ata voters.

The problem of production efficiency and adequately trained manpower arises in industry as well as in agriculture, although less frequently and less violently. It may be that factories and mines by their

[1] The most dramatic case was that of Nurvasov, former KSSR minister of justice, who was expelled from the Party by the Central Committee of the All-Union Party for "corruption." At that time, other functionaries were ousted with him for "deception of Party organs and unworthy conduct in respect to cadre affairs."